This article analyzes farmers' choices of crop insurance contracts and offers empirical evidence of adverse selection in crop insurance markets. Farmers' risk characteristics, their level of income, and the cost of insurance significantly affect the choice of yield and revenue insurance products as well as the selection of alternative coverage levels. Empirical analysis indicates that high-risk farmers are more likely to select revenue insurance contracts and higher coverage levels. Results show that low-risk farmers are overcharged and high-risk farmers are undercharged for comparable insurance contracts, implying informational asymmetries in the crop insurance market.
INTRODUCTION
Rapid expansion has occurred since 1996 in the number of new federally backed insurance products offered to farmers in the United States. They include several new revenue insurance products that bring new challenges for evaluating the performance of the multiple-product crop insurance market. In some sense, these new products might be very instrumental in increasing efficiency in the U.S. crop insurance market by meeting the needs of different producers. The question arises, however, as to whether the introduction of these new products, viewed as efficiency mechanisms, reduce or eliminate adverse selection. This study is the first attempt to analyze the potential for adverse selection and test for its presence when a portfolio of insurance products is offered to farmers. The authors analyze the crop insurance market in Iowa, where multiple yield and revenue insurance products were offered to corn and soybean farmers starting in 1996.
Theoretical and empirical studies in automobile and health insurance markets have shown that adverse selection reduces the consumption of insurance by low-risk indiShiva S. Makki is a senior researcher at The Ohio State University, Columbus. Agapi Somwaru is a senior economist with the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). This research was funded by the Risk Management Agency, USDA. The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments received from Joy Harwood, Robert Dismukes, Jim Driscoll, Richard Heifner, Keith Coble, Barry Goodwin, Judith Sommer, and the three anonymous reviewers. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Economic Research Service or the USDA. viduals and results in the transfer of income from low-risk to high-risk insureds and eventual market failure. The seminal works of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) set the foundations and established market equilibria conditions under asymmetric information. Akerlof offers theoretical reasons for the failure of insurance markets when the insurer is unable to rate risk accurately, while Rothschild and Stiglitz provide a theoretical model of equilibrium in an insurance market characterized by asymmetric information between the insured and insurer. The Rothschild and Stiglitz model entails a separating equilibrium with low-risk and high-risk agents buying different insurance products, both of which break even individually. Miyazaki (1977) and Wilson (1977) further demonstrate that, when it is impossible or highly expensive to distinguish between high-and low-risk insurance applicants, the insurer prices insurance contracts at an average premium for all individuals. This results in undercharging high-risk customers and overcharging low-risk customers for similar contracts.
Empirical evidence in automobile and health insurance markets generally supports the predictions of these theoretical models (Browne, 1992; Browne and Doerpinghaus, 1993; Puelz and Snow, 1994) . Browne (1992) and Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993) found evidence of adverse selection in individual health insurance markets, while Puelz and Snow (1994) found similar results in the market for automobile insurance. However, more recent studies that apply new modeling frameworks have found no evidence of adverse selection in automobile insurance markets (Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse, 1998; Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse, 2001) . In an analysis of Canadian automobile insurance markets, Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse (1998) show that the Puelz and Snow model incompletely specified and that the model results are not robust. Furthermore, Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse (2001) show that adverse selection is not present in the Canadian automobile insurance markets when the model incorporates appropriate risk classification. They argue that effective risk categorization can reduce the gap between different risk types and minimize adverse selection problems. Chiappori and Salanie criticize earlier models for both the lack of explicit tests for adverse selection and the use of constrained functional forms. They develop parametric and nonparametric methods to test for asymmetric information in insurance markets. In an application to the French automobile insurance market, Chiappori and Salanie show that, when all observable variables are considered, adverse selection is at most a negligible phenomenon.
Several studies have documented the implications of asymmetric information on the performance of crop insurance markets in the United States. Ray (1974) argues that adverse selection in crop insurance markets can make the industry less self-sustaining if only high-risk farmers buy insurance, as evidenced in the U.S. market for crop insurance. Skees and Reed (1986) show that the potential for adverse selection depends on farmers' subjective assessments of expected yield and variability of yield. They argue that premium rates based only on expected crop yields can lead to adverse selection, particularly when the variance of yields fluctuates considerably among farms. Goodwin (1993) illustrates the effects of adverse selection on the actuarial performance of the U.S. crop insurance market, stating that only those individuals whose risk is above average are most likely to purchase insurance. In a review of the U.S. crop insurance markets, Goodwin and Smith (1995) indicate that there is considerable evidence of adverse selection and that adverse selection is a direct consequence of insurers' inability to set premiums commensurate with the level of risk. In a more recent study, Just, Calvin, and Quiggin (1999) examine the adverse selection problem in the U.S. crop insurance market using nationwide data. Their results suggest that farmers who participate in the crop insurance program tend to have higher expected indemnities, because farmers with lower expected indemnities have been priced out of the program. These studies present arguments for the presence of adverse selection and show that the actual premium rates often fail to reflect farmers' expected indemnities in U.S. crop insurance markets.
The studies cited above narrowly focus on adverse selection at a time when only yield insurance products were offered to farmers and farmer participation was quite low. In addition, none of the crop insurance studies explicitly tests for adverse selection. This article presents evidence of adverse selection when both the number of insurance products available and farmers' participation are increasing. The authors' empirical results indicate that farmers' decisions to buy yield or revenue insurance are significantly affected by the risks they face, their levels of income, and the cost of insurance. This analysis also indicates that inaccurate assessment of individual risks would result in overcharging low-risk farmers and undercharging high-risk farmers for comparable contracts.
CROP YIELD AND REVENUE INSURANCE CONTRACTS
In agriculture, farmers are exposed to production and price risks. Farmers can purchase an insurance contract by paying a premium to protect against the expected risk of loss. A typical insurance contract includes a choice of crop yield or revenue insurance product with a certain level of yield or revenue guarantee, often referred to as the coverage level. Yield insurance products protect farmers against the shortfalls in crop yields, while revenue insurance products protect farmers against revenue risk caused by shortfalls in yield, price, or both.
Several yield and revenue insurance products are available to farmers. Yield insurance products include Actual Production History (APH) insurance, Catastrophic Coverage (CAT), and Group Risk Plan (GRP), while revenue insurance products include Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Income Protection (IP), and Revenue Assurance (RA).
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Revenue insurance products, such as CRC, RA, and IP, were offered on a large scale beginning in 1997, in addition to the traditional yield insurance products, such as APH, CAT, and the GRP. In terms of geographic coverage, revenue insurance products represented nearly one-third of insured acres for corn in Iowa in 1997 (Makki and Somwaru, 1999) . For more details on the design, operation, and indemnity payment structures under different products, see Harwood et al. (1999) or Risk Management Agency (2000).
APH insurance includes catastrophic coverage (CAT) and optional "buy-up" levels of coverage above CAT. For a flat fee of $60 per crop per farm, CAT provides a 50 percent yield guarantee and pays an indemnity based on 55 percent of the projected price. Buy-up coverage refers to yield guarantees above 50 percent and up to 75 percent for a fee. In this analysis, the authors separate CAT and APH buy-up coverage and hereafter refer to APH buy-up simply as "APH insurance." An insured's choice of an insurance contract is primarily a function of the risk of loss, the willingness to pay for insurance (which is a measure of risk aversion), and the cost of insurance (Puelz and Snow, 1994) . However, insurers set premium rates as a function of insurance contract choice and other observable characteristics indicative of risk. Under asymmetric information, the equilibrium insurance contracts depend on the manner in which insureds and insurers interact in the market. The authors extend the asymmetric information framework developed in automobile and health insurance markets to analyze the crop insurance market. In particular, they apply the methods developed in Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse (1998) and Chiappori and Salanie (2000) to analyze the choice of crop insurance contracts and to provide evidence of asymmetric information, if any, in the market for crop yield and revenue insurance products.
METHODS AND HYPOTHESES

Choice of Insurance Contracts
A generalized polytomous logit (GPL) model is estimated to analyze the choice of insurance products, and a three-stage least-squares (TSLS) model is estimated to analyze the choice of coverage levels. The probability that a farmer will choose a particular product is given by the probability that the utility of that product is greater than the utility from any other available alternative. The probability that a farmer will choose one of the m alternative insurance products, i Φ , from a set of choices, Φ , is given by
is the utility for alternative , ii x Φ is a vector of variables that affect the choice of the insurance product, and b is a vector of parameters. The expression ( ) U • is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, assumed to be increasing, strictly concave (reflecting risk aversion), and differentiable. >From all the contracts offered, the individual will choose the one that maximizes his or her expected utility.
Because the response variable, i.e., choice of insurance product, has no inherent ordering, the authors estimate Equation (1) as a generalized logit function (Greene, 1990; Kennedy, 1992; Long, 1997; Stokes, Davis, and Koch, 1998) . The logit of the response variable is formed as a ratio of the probability of choosing a product over the probability of choosing the reference product:
where ( ) 1,2,,1 kr =− … indexes the choice of insurance products; r is the reference choice or the choice used as the basis for comparison; h, i, and j reference the explanatory variables; and hijk h , which represents Equation (1), is the probability of the th k choice. The model that applies to all logits simultaneously, for every combination of the explanatory variables, in a matrix form, is
where k indexes the choice of the product. Interpretation of the GPL parameter estimates is not very straightforward, as the dependent variable is categorical (measured on a nominal scale). To facilitate interpretation of the model parameters, the authors estimate probabilities and odds ratios. The predicted probability that a particular product is chosen is a function of the estimated model parameters given in Equation (3), while odds ratios are obtained from the predicted probabilities (Stoke, Davis, and Koch, 1998) . For example, the odds of choosing product k by the high-risk farmer relative to the low-risk farmer is as follows:
where h and l are reference risk types. The odds ratio measures the likelihood of choosing an insurance product over any other choice. Determining the odds of an event not occurring involves taking the inverse of the effect of the odds of the event occurring (Long, 1997) .
Explanatory variables used in the GPL model include the probability of yield or revenue falling below the guaranteed level to represent the expected risk of loss, the level of income or size of operation to represent the willingness to pay for insurance, and the premium per dollar of liability to represent the cost of insurance (Table 1) . For yield insurance products, the risk of loss is captured by the probability of yield falling below the guaranteed level ( ) p Y , while for revenue insurance products, the risk of loss is captured by the probability of revenue falling below the guaranteed level ( ) p R . Assuming a normal distribution of yield, p Y is estimated for each insured ed farm based on ten years of yield records and the guarantee level chosen by the farmer. 3 p R is estimated for each insured farm based on ten years of yield records, the marketing year average prices, and the guarantee level chosen by the farmer. Farm revenues are also assumed to be normally distributed.
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Instead of estimating one set of parameters for one logit function, as in a logistic regression for a dichotomous response variable, GPL models estimate sets of parameters for multiple logit functions. The CATMOD procedure in SAS is a convenient way to perform the generalized logistic regression when the model contains qualitative variables (Stokes, Davis, and Koch, 1998) . Just and Weninger (1999) fail to reject normality of yield distribution for Kansas farm-level wheat, corn, and sorghum yield data. In a recent study, Just, Calvin, and Quiggin (1999) assume a normal distribution for corn yield histories. The authors recognize that several studies including Buccola (1986) , Moss and Shonkwiler (1993) , Nelson and Preckel (1989) , and Taylor (1990) reject the normality assumption. However, there seems to be no consensus among these studies regarding skewness of the distributions. If, indeed, the underlying yield and revenue distributions are non-normal, the quality of the current results are unlikely to change. Coverage level Alternative coverage levels that range from 50 percent to 85 percent in an interval of 5 percent.
Premium rate Premium rate is the premium per dollar of liability (premium/ liability).
Risk of loss Probability of yield or revenue falling below the guaranteed level, estimated for each farm based on ten years of yield records and using the corresponding year market average price. Detailed estimation procedure is available from the authors.
Loss frequency
Ex post observation of whether a farmer filed a claim, also known as loss frequency; set equal to one for those who filed a claim and set equal to zero otherwise.
Yield span A yield-spanning process creates nine discrete categories (R01 through R09) of yields. Category R01 is associated with the lowest average yields, while category R09 is associated with the highest average yields. The yield-span ranges are derived from historical county loss experience and are calibrated to the expected county yield. Premium rates for each category are inversely proportional to the farm's expected yield. Thus, farms in relative expected yield categories 1 to 4 are charged premium rates that are higher than the county rate. Conversely, farms in relative expected yield categories 6 to 9 are charged lower premiums than the county rate.
Farm income
Income is estimated for each farmer as follows:
A is the number of acres, t Y is the yield per acre, t P is the State average price, and l is the proportion of income saved, which is assumed to be 0.10.
Expected indemnity Expected indemnity, ( )
EI , is estimated for each farmer as follows:
( ) EI for a typical yield insurance contract:
EI for a typical revenue insurance contract: 
Farm practice
Farm practice, which indicates whether a farm is irrigated, is set equal to one for irrigated farms and zero for nonirrigated farms.
Ownership share Ownership share is the percentage share of the crop owned by the insured.
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The variables p Y and p R represent asymmetric information between the insurer and the insured, in the sense that, at the time of contract choice, the insured knows more about his or her risk of loss than does the insurer. 4 This measure of risk is constructed using past yield or revenue histories and a chosen guarantee level and thus provides a robust measure of the individual's risk. In addition, this measure of risk accounts for both the mean and variance of yield or revenue, unlike the traditional method of assessing risk in crop insurance, which is mainly based on mean yields (Skees and Reed, 1986; Goodwin, 1994; Just, Calvin, and Quiggin, 1999) . A significant coefficient for risk of loss implies that low-risk and high-risk farmers purchase different products.
Because neither farm income nor net worth data was available, the level of income that represents willingness to pay is proxied by accumulated savings. Conceptually, income indicates the liquidity position of a farmer, which is an important determinant of the willingness to pay for an insurance contract (Makki and Miranda, 2000) . The farmer's level of income, which is proportional to the size of the operation, also indicates the amount of revenue at risk, along with the operator's ability to pay for insurance or to self-insure against the risk of loss. In this analysis, income is estimated for each farmer as
where M is the income level, t A is the number of acres insured in time t, t Y is the yield per acre in time t, t P is the marketing-year average price in time t, and l is the proportion of gross revenue saved in each year. The parameter, l , is assumed to be equal to 0.10 or 10 percent of gross revenue (Halbrook and Stafford, 1971 ).
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The authors expect the choice of insurance contracts to be related to income in a manner consistent with the decreasing risk aversion hypothesis. This is equivalent to asserting that farmers with higher incomes retain the risk of some losses. One expects that high-income farmers would be more likely to choose the lower coverage contracts as they can self-insure and manage variations in income within their operations better than farmers with lower incomes.
The cost of insurance, captured by premium per dollar of liability, is calculated as total premium (including subsidy) divided by total liability. Liability represents the maximum potential indemnity or value of the insurance contract if the producer loses the entire crop. This measure of insurance cost facilitates comparison across different 4 The assumption that the insured knows ex ante more about the risk of loss than the insurer is a valid one. However, the variable used to represent the risk of loss may not capture all the informational asymmetries that exist between the two insuring parities (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000) . In this article, the risk of loss ( ) or pp YR is estimated using observable values of past yield records and guarantee levels, and, therefore, its values may not contain asymmetric information between insureds and insurers in strict sense. However, they may yet be the best estimation of expected risk of loss by the insurer (see Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse, 1998) .
5 Halbrook and Stafford (1971) indicate that the average weighted marginal propensity to consume for the general population is between 0.87 and 0.90. Consequently, the estimated marginal propensity to save would range from 0.10 to 0.13. insurance contracts. Before reform of the program in 2000, premiums were subsidized by USDA's Risk Management Agency at up to 42 percent (Makki and Somwaru, 1999) , but the authors use total premium recorded for the contract. The statistical significance of the premium rate in Equation (3) has implications for public subsidization of the crop insurance programs. In this study, the authors refrain from analyzing the effects of subsidy on adverse selection. (See Goodwin and Vandeveer, 2000 , for more on the effects of federal subsidy on crop insurance markets.)
The GPL model develops a separate group for each distinct combination of the explanatory variables. The limitation of this procedure is that continuous explanatory variables create a large number of combinations, rendering the results impossible to interpret. To overcome this limitation, the authors group each of the explanatory variables into three categories-low, medium, and high-using its mean and standard (6) and (7) are estimated simultaneously using the three-stage least-squares procedure because it is often the case in crop insurance that, after the farmer selects a product, he or she is offered a menu of coverage-premium combinations from which to choose. This results in correlated error terms ( ) and ii ue requiring a simultaneous equation system approach. The procedure is applied to each insurance product separately.
The set of explanatory variables in Equation (6) include risk of loss, level of income, premium rate, practice, ownership share, loss frequency, and yield span, while Equation (7) includes risk of loss, income, coverage level, practice, ownership share, loss frequency, and yield span (see Table 1 ). Definition and interpretation of the variables risk of loss ( )
, and the cost of insurance ( ) p are similar to that of GPL model. For example, significant coefficients for risk of loss imply that low-risk and high-risk farmers purchase different coverage levels within a given product, while a nonsignificant coefficient implies that different risk types purchase similar coverage levels.
Farm practice-i.e., whether or not a farm is irrigated-is included because irrigation has the potential to reduce yield risks and may provide farmers the incentive to select higher coverage levels. For the econometric analysis, practice is set equal to one for irrigated farms and zero for nonirrigated farms.
Ownership share, which is the percentage share of the crop owned by the insured, could potentially influence the choice of an insurance contract. However, the direction of the effect on the level of coverage purchased is indeterminate. A positive effect implies that, as the share of ownership increases, farmers are more likely to purchase higher coverage contracts. This is plausible because full ownership could mean greater dependence on farm income for livelihood. Conversely, a negative effect is also possible as tenant farmers are usually more leveraged and thus may be subjected to insurance requirements from lenders (Gardner and Kramer, 1986; Goodwin, 1993; Wu, 1999) . Given these conflicting effects, the issue of whether ownership share is positively or negatively associated with the insurance purchase decision must be resolved empirically.
The loss frequency is an ex post observation of whether a farmer has filed a claim on the insurance policy. For the econometric analysis, loss frequency is set equal to one for those who have filed a claim and is set equal to zero otherwise. A positive coefficient for loss frequency would indicate that farmers who have claimed indemnity payments in the past are likely to purchase higher coverage levels. The USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA) uses the "yield span" concept to categorize farms into different groups. The yield spanning approach classifies farmers' yields into nine discrete risk categories (R01 through R09) based on the ratio of a farmer's yield to the average county yield. According to the yield span concept, category R01 includes the lowest average yields, while category R09 includes the highest average yields. Yield span ranges are derived from historical county loss experience and are calibrated to the expected county yield. Yield span is a key factor in computing premium rates (GAO, 1999; Skees and Reed, 1986) .
Testing for Adverse Selection
The authors test for adverse selection using a two-step procedure. First, they test the conditional independence of the choice of insurance contract and the risk of loss using nonparametric methods.
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Two nonparametric tests, the Kruskal-Wallis c 2 and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, are performed to find out whether the choice of contract and the risk of loss are independent. The Kruskal-Wallis test statistic is given by:
Nonparametric methods use less restrictive functional forms and account for more complicated nonlinear relationships among variables (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000) .
where N is the sample size, i T is the rank assigned to the ith group, and i n is the number of groups in the sample. The test statistic H approximately follows a chisquared distribution with 1 k − degrees of freedom. See Conover (1980) for more e details on the Kruskal-Wallis test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is given by:
where ( )
M
Fx is the empirical cdf and F(x) is the cdf of a ( ) c 2 1 . Under conditional independence, the test statistic K converges to a distribution that is tabulated in statistics textbooks (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000) . No adverse selection is in the data when the authors cannot reject conditional independence. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition because rejection of independence implies asymmetric information between the insured and the insurer that may occur either because of adverse selection or moral hazard (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000) . 7 The authors proceed to the next set of tests and illustrations that not only provide more clear evidence of adverse selection but also complement the tests presented above.
The second step involves comparing the actual and competitive premiums for different insurance contracts. In an efficient market, the competitive premium is equal to the expected indemnity (Puelz and Snow, 1994; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) . The expected indemnity ( ) EI is calculated for each insurance contract separately (see Table 1 ). In a competitive market, the difference between actual and competitive premium rates should be zero. Under asymmetric information, however, one would expect differences to exist between actual and competitive premium rates as the accurate determination of individual farmers' risk is either not possible or prohibitively expensive. The authors use nonparametric tests and graphical illustrations to demonstrate the differences, if any, between the actual and competitive premium rates. The two nonparametric tests performed are the Kruskal-Wallis c 2 test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, as described above.
Data used in this study are from the USDA's RMA, which maintains records of all individual farmers who buy federally backed crop-yield or -revenue insurance. The data pertain to corn farmers in Iowa for the 1997 crop year. The data used in this study represent fairly homogeneous growing conditions. The authors selected a sample of about 60,000 farm-level insurance records for which ten years of yield records were available. Data gathered for this study provide the first opportunity to analyze the choice of insurance contracts and to test for adverse selection when a portfolio of insurance products is offered.
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Two possible reasons allow the authors to conclude that the observed informational asymmetries are more likely due to adverse selection than to moral hazard. First, the risk of loss in agriculture is more because of weather and other natural factors. Insured individuals are less likely to affect the distribution of losses caused by such exogenous factors; hence the observed differences between the actual and the competitive premium rates are mostly due to adverse selection. Second, the crop insurance contracts do not insure full loss. Because crop insurance protects only up to 75 percent of expected yield or revenue, it is less likely that farmers would indulge in activities that would decrease yield or revenue by more than 25 percent. This is similar to the arguments made for deductibles to reduce moral hazard problems in automobile and health insurance markets.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Choice of Insurance Product
The authors estimate two GPL models using Equation (3). Model 1 analyzes product choices GRP, CRC, and RA with APH as the reference choice, while Model 2 analyzes product choices APH, GRP, CRC, or RA with CAT as the reference choice. The reason for estimating Model 2 is to use the completely subsidized contract as the reference choice. 8 In both models, however, farmers make a choice from a portfolio of crop yield and revenue insurance products.
The maximum likelihood analysis of variance results is presented in Table 2 , which summarizes the main effects of Models 1 and 2. The likelihood ratio statistic indicates goodness-of-fit of the model, while the chi-square values indicate the significance of the explanatory variables. The estimated likelihood ratios for both models suggest a good fit. The likelihood ratio statistic for Model 1 has a value of 253 with 60 degrees of freedom (df), while Model 2 has a value of 367 with 80 df. A likelihood ratio test is performed to determine whether the two specifications are statistically different. Test results indicate that the two models are indeed different. Because models 1 and 2 represent choices with respect to APH, which is a partially subsidized product, and CAT, which is a completely subsidized product, the authors infer that premium subsidies are likely to influence farmers' decisions in choosing an insurance product. The likelihood Ratio Test statistic is given by 2log l − , where l is the ratio of two likelihood ratios from Models 1 and 2 (Kennedy, 1992) . The statistic is distributed asymptotically as chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed. Table 2 reveal a strong relationship between risk of loss and the choice of insurance products. The variable risk of loss has Wald Chi-Square values of 1,712 with 6 df in Model 1, and 1,920 with 8 df in Model 2. The authors reject the hypothesis that risk of loss has no influence on the choice of insurance products at less than the 1 percent level of significance.
Results presented in
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These results imply that low-and highrisk farmers choose different products depending on their expected risk of loss.
The results also indicate that income has a significant influence on the choice of insurance products (see Table 2 ). The Wald Chi-square values for income are 630 with 6 df in Model 1 and 744 with 8 df in Model 2. The cost of insurance, captured by the premium per dollar of liability, is also a critical factor in choosing a product. The premium rate is statistically significant, with Wald Chi-square values of 6,225 with 6 df in Model 1 and 9,554 with 8 df in Model 2. Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the two GPL models, along with the standard errors that indicate the statistical significance of the estimated parameters. Parameter estimates are arranged according to the logits they reference. In what follows, the authors limit the discussion to the model that analyzes the choice of insurance products with APH as the reference choice.
The authors compare the odds of choosing CRC, RA, and GRP over APH by farmers of different risk types and income levels. For example, the odds of choosing CRC over APH by high vs. low risk farmers are computed using Equation (4) and the Model 1 parameters in Table 3 Thus, the odds ratio indicates that high-risk farmers are 1.95 times more likely to choose CRC over APH than low risk farmers. The authors' analysis also indicates that the expected indemnity payoffs (expressed as a percent of liability) from the revenue insurance products, CRC and RA, are about 12 percent for high-risk farmers relative to 2 to 3 percent for low-risk farmers (see Table 4 ).
Because GRP indemnities are based on county-level losses, high-risk farmers would find them less attractive relative to APH. The expected indemnity payoffs for highrisk farmers were 4 and 9 percent, respectively, for GRP and APH products (see Table 4 ). In general, the results indicate that high-risk farmers prefer revenue insurance relative to yield insurance and individual insurance relative to group insurance.
The results presented in Table 3 suggest that high-income farmers prefer CRC and RA over APH, within the same risk class. The odds of choosing CRC over APH by high-income farmers relative to low-income farmers is given by 9 A Wald test is a statistic that takes the form of a squared ratio of one estimate to its standard error; it follows an approximate chi-square distribution when the sample size is sufficiently large (Stokes, Davis, and Koch, 1998; Long, 1997) . The advantage of the Wald test over the Likelihood Ratio test is that the Wald test only requires estimating a single model. Thus, it is easier to apply when there are many variables to test. The practical weakness of the Likelihood Ratio test is that first the full model must be estimated, and then k restricted models corresponding to excluding each of the k xs. This odds ratio indicates that high-income farmers are 1.5 times more likely to choose CRC over APH relative to low-income farmers within the same risk category. One possible explanation for high-income farmers' greater willingness to buy revenue insurance products is that they attempt to maximize payoffs from these crop insurance contracts that are subsidized by the federal government. Another possible explanation is that the accumulated savings used as a proxy for income are more a measure of a liquidity constraint than a measure of risk aversion. All coverage levels are combined for RA and GRP and for lack of sufficient number of contracts under different risk types.
Choice of Coverage Level
The estimated Equations (6) and (7) reveal a strong relationship between risk of loss and choice of coverage level (see Table 5 ). The positive and significant coefficients for risk of loss indicate that farms that have a higher probability of yield or revenue falling below the guarantee level are more likely to choose higher coverage contracts.
Results are consistent across all products. This implies that farmers choose coverage levels depending on their expected risk of loss.
The estimated relationship between income and choice of coverage level is positive and significant for APH, CRC, and RA. The positive coefficient implies a preference for greater coverage by high-income farmers and fails to support the hypothesis that high-income farmers prefer lower coverage levels and retain the risk of some losses. A possible explanation for this behavior is that farmers maximize the premium subsidy they receive from the government and that the subsidies are tied to coverage levels. 
Explanatory Variables
The coefficients for ownership share and farm practice show a negative association with coverage level. This implies that, as the ownership share decreases, farmers are more likely to choose higher coverage levels. One explanation for this result is that farmers who lease land (lower ownership share) are often required to purchase insurance, particularly when external financing is involved. This result is consistent with the findings of Wu (1999) . A negative coefficient for farm practice indicates that farmers who irrigate their land prefer lower coverage compared with nonirrigated farms. This is likely because irrigation generally reduces production risks.
The relationship between the loss frequency and the choice of coverage level is positive and nonsignificant for all products except for GRP (see Table 5 ). The results imply that farmers who incurred a loss and claimed indemnity payments in the previous period are more likely to purchase higher coverage in the current period. The estimated relationship between loss frequency and premium rate is positive and statistically significant for all products, which implies that loss frequency is an important variable in setting premium rates.
Results show that the yield span-the ratio of actual yield to the county-level average-is a significant variable in the determination of premium rates and the choice of coverage levels (see Table 5 ). The positive relationship between coverage level and yield span implies that farmers with higher expected yields are more likely to buy higher coverage levels. This is because the premium rates and yield span categories are inversely proportional, implying lower premium rates for farms with higher expected yields.
Evidence of Adverse Selection
Testing for Independence of Insurance Contract Choice and Risk of Loss. The KruskalWallis and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are used to test the hypothesis of independence between the choice of insurance contract and the risk of loss. For example, the hypothesis of independence between the choice of insurance product and the risk of loss is rejected by both tests at the 1 percent significance level (see Table 6 ). The computed value of c = 2 1,251.5 for the Kruskal-Wallis test is much larger than the 1 percent critical value, which is 9.21 at 2 degrees of freedom. The computed value of K = 18.98 for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is much larger than the 1 percent critical value, which is 1.63. The nonparametric tests also reject the independence of the choice of coverage and the risk of loss for each insurance product at the 1 percent significance level. These results imply that the choice of insurance contract and the risk of loss are correlated or that the null hypothesis of conditional independence is rejected, implying the presence of adverse selection in the crop insurance market.
Testing for the Difference Between Actual and Competitive Premium Rates. The authors test for the difference between actual and competitive premium rates using nonparametric tests followed by a graphical illustration of the difference. The two nonparametric tests, Kruskal-Wallis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov, reject the hypothesis that the actual and competitive rates are not different at the 1 percent significance level for all products except GRP (see Table 6 ). The computed values of KruskalWallis c 2 for APH, CRC, RA, and GRP are 13,668; 10,397; 2,738; and 1.96, respectively, compared to the critical value of 9.21 at 2 degrees of freedom. For GRP, non-parametric tests indicate that the actual and competitive rates are not statistically different from each other. This finding is consistent with Mahul (1999) , who argues that an area yield insurance program mitigates adverse selection problems because information about area yields is more easily available and is more accurate than information about individual farm yields. Figure 1 compares the actual and competitive premium rates across different risk of loss for APH insurance at the 65 percent coverage level. The figure shows that lowrisk farmers are overcharged (pay more than their competitive rates) and high-risk farmers are undercharged (pay less than their competitive rates) for their respective insurance contracts. In other words, the actual premium rates fail to accurately reflect individual farmers' likelihood of losses. A relatively flat actual premium rate across different risks of loss is probably the result of insurers averaging premium rates.
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Figure 1 also indicates that the disparity between the actual and competitive rates is higher at extreme risk levels, implying the underlying difficulty in assessing individual farmers' risks accurately. The results are similar in the case of CRC (see Figure 2 ) and RA (see Figure 3) and are different in the case of GRP (see Figure 4) . Figure 4 indicates that actual and competitive premium rates for GRP are comparable across all risk of losses.
In sum, the authors find significant correlation between the contract choice and risk of loss. Their analysis further indicates that individual risks are not assessed accurately and that premium rates reflect average risks, which leads them to conclude that there is evidence of adverse selection in the individualized crop insurance market for Iowa corn.
Whether the problem of adverse selection is intrinsic to crop insurance or whether it is a consequence of program design is beyond the scope of this article. However, the authors do recognize that government regulations might have contributed to the presence of adverse selection in crop insurance markets. For example, as a public program, the government forbids the insurer to condition the contract on some observable traits, e.g., demographic factors, that would improve risk assessment of individual farms. Also, under current reinsurance arrangements, insurance companies transfer most of the risk to the government and therefore have little incentive to monitor problems generated by asymmetric information (see Makki, 2000) .
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, the authors analyze the choice of insurance contracts and present evidence of adverse selection in Iowa corn insurance markets. They develop an analytical framework that captures the essence of current crop insurance markets, which are characterized by multiple crop yield and revenue insurance products and alternative coverage levels. The authors analyze the impact of farmers' risk characteristics and levels of income, as well as the cost of insurance, on their choices of yield and revenue insurance products and alternative coverage levels. They present nonparametric procedures to test for adverse selection under asymmetric information conditions. The data pertain to Iowa corn producers and five different insurance products that were offered in 1997. The data gathered for the study provide the first opportunity to test the potential for adverse selection when a portfolio of insurance products is offered to U.S. producers.
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RMA calculates premium rates for each crop in each county for farmers who buy 65 percent coverage and whose normal production level is about equal to the average production in the county. Rates are subsequently adjusted for loss experience in that county, farmers' average crop yields relative to the county average yield, and different coverage levels selected by farmers (GAO, 1999) .
The authors use a generalized polytomous logit model to analyze the nominal choice of alternative insurance products. The results indicate that high-risk farmers are more likely to choose revenue insurance products and higher coverage levels. High-risk farmers are also more likely to choose an individual plan over a group-based plan. Results also suggest that high-income farmers are more likely to buy revenue insurance and higher coverage levels. In the absence of perfect information, high-risk farmers have a greater incentive to select contracts that provide higher coverage because of higher expected benefits.
The authors find evidence of adverse selection in the Iowa crop insurance market. The analysis suggests that the premium rate fails to reflect individuals' probability of loss accurately and their expected size of indemnity benefits. Premium rates charged to farmers with different risks of loss are likely to suffer from averaging. The areayield insurance product seems to suffer less from adverse selection compared with individualized yield and revenue insurance products.
This study is the first attempt to test for adverse selection in a new agricultural policy environment that allows for multiple products to be offered to producers. By examining risk and other characteristics associated with farmers who buy different contracts, it may be possible to structure insurance rates to more closely reflect farmers' risk profiles. A prudent method of risk assessment that is tied to yield and revenue variability might be the key to avoiding adverse selection in the market for multiple yield and revenue insurance products. Even though this analysis is limited to Iowa corn producers, the findings provide useful insights into asymmetric information problems in crop insurance markets and preferences of farmers of various risk types in choosing among alternative insurance contracts.
